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ABSTRACT 
Even though an effective bureaucracy is known to be a vital factor in the emergence of a 
developmental state, this has not received the necessary attention in the literature. This thesis 
argues that the emergence of a developmental state is contingent on a developmental 
bureaucracy, which is in turn spawned by a developmental leadership. A developmental 
leadership creates a developmental bureaucracy through the depoliticisation of economic 
issues and the insulation of the bureaucracy from political interference. In substantiating this 
central argument, two countries – South Korea under Park Chung-hee, and Ghana under 
Kwame Nkrumah – are studied. South Korea and Ghana present contrasting fortunes of 
progress on the path of development. In 1957 when Ghana gained independence, its per 
capita income was more than that of South Korea. Two decades later Korea‘s per capita 
increased over tenfold, while that of Ghana declined. Based on an analysis of the existing 
literature, the study concludes that the two countries went in opposite direction because while 
South Korea had a developmental leader in Park Chung-hee, who created an insulated 
bureaucracy and therefore engineered a developmental Korean state, Ghana under Nkrumah 
lacked this attribute. Rather, Nkrumah prioritized politics over economic development, in the 
process politicizing the Ghanaian bureaucracy and consequently incapacitating it from 
spawning a developmental state. Evidence of the contrasting positions of the leaders was 
drawn not only from their political statements and respective ideological stance, but also from 
their conduct of foreign policies. While Ghana under Nkrumah flirted with the communist 
world, Korea under Park Chung-hee strengthened ties with the west. The thesis concludes 
that a fuller understanding of the contrasting developmental fortunes of South Korea and 
Ghana must begin with an understanding of how the bureaucracy functioned in these two 
countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
When Ghana became independent in 1957, per capita incomes of Ghana and Korea were 
US$490 and US$491, respectively (Werlin, 1994).  Two decades later, in the early 1980s, 
Ghana‘s annual per capita income had deteriorated to US$400, and it was one fifth of Korea‘s 
per capita income which had surpassed US$2,000 at that time (Werlin, 1994).  A further 
twenty years later, in the early 2000s, the gap had grown wider – Ghana‘s GNI per capita 
went even lower to US$300, while Korea‘s reached US$10,000. (Moss, 2003).   According 
to the World Bank‘s recent data1, Korea‘s gross national income per capita is US$21,530 
contrasted with Ghana‘s US$670 which is less than one thirty-second of Korea‘s.   
 
How are these dramatic opposite directions to be explained?  In a nutshell, Korea has 
succeeded in transforming itself to a developmental state.  Ghana, on the other hand, has 
remained bound by the poverty trap.  
 
Chalmers Johnson, who coined the term developmental state (Leftwich, 1995, p. 403), and 
other developmental statists have linked interventionism with swift economic growth and 
emphasized on the role of a bureaucracy in economic development.  The virtue of 
interventionism has been acknowledged even more widely after the disastrous failure of 
Structural Adjustment Programs whose neo-classical experiments were conducted in large 
parts of the developing world.  Recently, it seems it is agreed that autonomous and insulated 
                                                 
1
 The World Bank, World Indicators database, July 1, 2009, obtained on July 20, 2009 from 
www.worldbank .org 
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bureaucracy committed to economic development is a necessary condition for economic 
development.  In other words, failing to become a developmental state indicates the lack of 
a bureaucracy committed to economic development, i.e. a developmental bureaucracy.  
Accordingly, in order to find out the reasons why some countries fail to become 
developmental states, one must study why they fail to initiate a developmental bureaucracy. 
 
According to Weber (1968), a range of incentives are needed to build an assured bureaucracy 
and to avoid it ending up being ―legal enslavement of the functionaries‖, and these are salary, 
career opportunity, sense of honor, and prestige along with public responsibility (p. 968).  
This thesis hypothesizes that it is the leadership that offers those incentives.  In addition, 
particularly in a developmental state, developmental leadership plays another vital role: that 
of presenting long-term collective goals of economic development and exploiting and 
maintaining the bureaucracy to achieve those goals.   
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Therefore, a causality can be drawn from developmental leadership to a developmental 
bureaucracy (flow ①) and finally to a developmental state (flow ②).  In other words, one 
can understand the whole causality of the developmental state by studying the role of 
leadership that generates a developmental bureaucracy; without flow ① (from leadership to 
a bureaucracy) in Figure 1, it is impossible to reach the subsequent flow ② (from 
bureaucracy to developmental state).  Analyses on developmental states have focused on the 
significance of bureaucracy and its policies (flow ②).  However, current literature has 
failed to address the causes, origins, or formations of development-committed bureaucracies 
(flow ①), and research demonstrating the link between developmental leaderships and 
developmental bureaucracies has not been published.  Johns and Sakong (1980) once wrote 
that leadership also could make a positive and meaningful difference in economic 
development (p. 291), but their focal point was not how leadership impacted on 
developmental state.  This thesis studies the conditions and significance of flow ①—how 
developmental leadership spawns a developmental bureaucracy, thus offering complete 
causality of a developmental state. 
 
This thesis examines how developmental leadership gives birth to a developmental 
bureaucracy through depoliticizing developmental issues in developmental states. A 
nonpolitical developmental leader creates a developmental bureaucracy which subsequently 
contributes to the emergence of a developmental state.  A developmental leader is 
nonpolitical so that instead of beefing up a particular political party, the leader builds a strong 
bureaucracy and allocates more power to the bureaucracy.  The leader‘s commitment to 
economic development and a developmental bureaucracy plays a critical role in the 
developmental state at two significant levels: domestically and internationally. 
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At the domestic level, a nonpolitical leader forgoes short-term political gains for long-term 
economic achievement by allocating long-term planning to a bureaucracy.  When a leader is 
motivated by short-term political popularity, long-term economic development goals are 
consequently compromised and economic policies lose predictability and consistency.  It is 
common for a political leader to face the dilemma between long-term economic requirements 
and short-term political considerations (Shaun, 1996, p. 692).  However, a developmental 
political leader grants life-long career incentives and assigns long-term economic planning 
work to a bureaucracy.  This point is reinforced by the degree of autonomy and insulation 
that protect the bureaucracy from political influence.  Since a bureaucracy is not bound to 
short-term popularity, the leader is able to depoliticize long-term economic decisions and 
avoiding pork- barrel politics. 
 
At the international level, a nonpolitical leader seeks international economic partners not 
based on a particular political ideology but on long-term economic gains by utilizing a 
decision-making bureaucracy.  Insufficient investment, along with outdated technology, is 
one of the biggest obstacles in economic development, especially for late industrializers.  
These deficient but critical endowments can be brought in from other nations in order to 
accomplish faster economic development.  Thus, a state has to choose the right international 
partners; a state makes a detour in its economic development when its international partners 
are selected based on the political ideology and not on the benefits for its own economy.  A 
state can take a shortcut by opting for practical international partners from a nonpolitical 
standpoint.  The nonpolitical developmental leader assigns this job to a bureaucracy so that 
the failure that could incur in two-level games (Putnam, 1988) is avoided; a bureaucracy 
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which fully controls decision making process in foreign policies does not need the ratification 
of parliament. 
 
To examine this hypothesis, the thesis studies two cases—Ghana under the leadership of 
Kwame Nkrumah and Korea under Park Chung-hee—in order to understand the conditions 
for, and the significance, of developmental leadership in the emergence of a developmental 
state.   
 
Each case is examined at two different levels: leaders‘ commitments expressed in their public 
statements and the relevant policies that were delivered on the commitments.  The thesis 
thus studies their commitment to economic development.  When one looks initially at the 
leadership of each of these countries, one is likely to get a prima facie impression that 
political leaders have been insisting on economic development.  African leaders also 
explicitly pronounce their commitment to economic development.  However, it would be 
naïve if declared intentions of leaders were accepted to be their commitments.  One writer 
pointed out that it is ―easy to confuse this apparent emphasis on development with reality and 
to disregard the fact that economic development has been very much a second priority in the 
minds of African politicians [emphasis added]‖ (McCarthy, 1994, p. 100).  Ghana is not an 
exception in this sense.  No matter what has been said by their political leaders, many 
Ghanaian thinkers have claimed that the politicians have not taken economic development 
seriously (Werlin, 1994, p. 207).  Jan Kees Van Donge (2009) also concluded that the 
international drive toward Africa‘s good governance and economic development would not 
work properly as long as the ―predatory elites‖ remained untouched (p. 69).  Thus, this study 
employs a pragmatic approach by examining their commitments expressed in their speeches. 
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In developmental states, the structures of institutions and policies are developmentally driven 
even though the objectives of the economic development are politically motivated (Leftwich, 
1995, p. 401).  In this sense, the thesis studies Park and Nkrumah‘s leadership with regard to 
how they depoliticized economic policies.  Firstly, at domestic level, the thesis studies the 
degree of each leader‘s commitment to building a strong bureaucracy in order to depoliticize 
economic policies.  Secondly, at the international level, it examines how each leader 
depoliticized the issue of selecting international partners for the economic development of 
their nations.  In order to test these hypotheses, the thesis first studies a number of primary 
materials which include speeches, letters, personal journals, autobiographies and policy 
statements of each leader.  The commitments which are expressed in the primary materials 
are further examined through relevant policy reforms.  
 
 
2. Literature Review 
    2-1. Developmental State 
 
Developmental states refer to the states that have accomplished fast economic development 
through strong intervention of efficient bureaucracies.  The developmental states ―try to 
actively ‗intervene‘ in economic process and direct the course of development, rather than 
relying on market forces‖ (Beeson, 2007, p. 141).  
 
Neoclassical scholars were proponents of the market triumphalism; they believed in market 
and its power of optimizing efficiency and efficacy through the equilibrium between 
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individual suppliers and consumers.  In other words, economies work best when government 
interventions are least.  In neoclassical orthodoxy, government interventions should be 
limited to the correction of market failure because state interventions create rent-seeking 
behaviors.  Markets have magical capability of working toward the equilibrium for itself, 
and intervening its self-controlling brings out negative effects only. 
 
Developmental state theory was an uncomfortable new idea not only to the mainstream 
neoclassical scholars but also to Marxists.  According to Marxist theorists, it was unlikely 
for peripheral states to be able to break the shackles of exploitation of core countries, and 
thus, the dependency and predations were expected to aggravate civil society until a 
revolution finally took place.  The existence of developmental states—the non-core groups 
of nations that established successful economic development without proletariat revolution 
were not consistent with the claim of the Marx-Leninists and dependency theorists (Beeson, 
2004, p. 29).  
 
When Chalmers Johnson presented the concept of the developmental state, it was regarded as 
―ideological resistance‖ against dominating western academia.  In one of his later books, 
Johnson recalled that it was ―an ideological red flag to the bull of Anglo-American cold war 
orthodoxy about economic correctness‖ (Johnson C. , 1999, p. 34).  The ideological 
resistance came from the positive facet that Johnson granted to the interventionism in a 
developmental state.  Even though most countries had some degree of government 
intervention, according to Johnson, the quality of intervention was distinctively different in 
the liberal states, in the Stalinist states and in the developmental states.  The interventionism 
in the US was regulatory oriented—i.e., the government only intervened in the market when 
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it needed to regulate it in order to prohibit unfair competitions or behaviors such as the cases 
of violating patents.  On the other hand, the intervention in Stalinist nations was ideology 
oriented.  Those interventions were differentiated from the development oriented Japanese 
intervention; Johnson established a ―third category alongside liberal and Stalinist conceptions‖ 
and described the third category as ―rational‖ planning (Cummings, 1999, p. 63).   
 
Chan (1993), who studied dynamism in East Asia, elaborated the difference between a 
regulatory state and developmental state.  Regulatory states minimized intervening market 
unless they had to regulate or protect certain conflicts, i.e., antitrust regulation and protection 
of consumer rights.  On the other hand, developmental states intervened in markets actively 
in order to achieve certain economic developmental goals, which included suggesting 
business models, guiding and protecting infant industries, and offering incentives.  Along 
with this critical difference, Chan added one more decisive characteristic of developmental 
states comparing regulative states: the presence of a pilot agency.  Developmental states 
developed a pilot agency which was in charge of overall economic tasks from planning to 
guiding and to coordinating industrial policies.  For example, Japan had a pilot agency of 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry; Korea had an Economic Planning Board; 
Taiwan had a Council for Economic Planning and Development; and Singapore had an 
Economic Development Board.  By comparison, instead of one powerful pilot agency, 
regulatory states had various executive departments which produced unnecessary conflicts 
over which the developmental issues became politicized.  
 
Before the concept of Developmental States was introduced, orthodox economists analyzed 
the successful cases of Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs)—Korea, Singapore, Hong 
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Kong, and Taiwan—from various perspectives but not from strong interventionism.  Some 
conventional neoclassical scholars analyzed the success of the NICs with the factors that 
were irrelevant to government interventions such as education level that improved the 
productivity of labor force or cheaper labor cost (Cumings, 1987, p. 47).  The World Bank 
report (1993) was one of those that called the East Asian miracle as a result of minimalist, 
market-friendly functional interventions (Sundaram & Ken, 1998). 
 
However, Wade (1990) refuted these neoclassical claims with cross-country examinations.  
He suggested that the role of government and policies were ignored in most literature on 
NICs, especially in the cases of Taiwan and Korea (p. 28).   Chang (2003) also has been 
constructing more theoretical structures on developmental states against mainstream 
neoclassical orthodox. He attacked dominating neoliberalism in western economic academia 
and suggested theoretical alternatives.  The concept of the developmental state was 
elaborated by subsequent scholars such as Bardhan (1990) who wrote as: 
      
It is not so much a matter, as is sometimes simple-mindedly put, of authoritarianism 
versus democracy.  Once developmental goals are centrally involved in the issues of 
legitimacy of the regime, I think it is not so much authoritarianism per se which makes 
a difference, but the extent of insulation (or “relative autonomy”) that the decision-
makers can organize against the ravages of short-run pork-barrel politics [emphasis 
added] (p. 5). 
 
Even though Johnson coined the term of developmental states, some scholars asserted that the 
concept had a longer history (Bagchi 2000; Chang 2002; Chan 1990/1993).  Bagchi (2000), 
who defined the developmental state as ―a state that puts economic development as the top 
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priority of governmental policy and is able to design effective instruments to promote such a 
goal,‖ insisted that developmental states existed before Chalmers Johnson named them (p. 
398).  According to his analysis, the Netherlands in the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries and Germany between 1850 and 1914 were in the category of developmental states 
based on his definition.  Chan (1993) also counted some late industrializers such as 
Germany, Japan, and Russia into the range of developmental sates on the basis that the 
interventions in those states were ―substantive‖ and not ―procedural‖ (p.58- 59). 
 
Witnessing Japan‘s stagnation and Asia‘s financial crisis, some scholars have argued about 
the myth or the death of developmental states.  However, the developmental state should be 
considered as a form of a state to kick-start economic development.  Johnson (1982) insisted 
that a developmental state must be a ―prerequisite‖ of other different types of following 
positive states.  In other words, based on the successful developmental states, various other 
advanced forms of states could be formed.  They could then become regulatory states or 
welfare states, however, these variations could be possible only after the precedent 
developmental state (p. 306).  
 
 
2-2. Bureaucracy 
 
In developmental state theory, the core factor of successful economic development is 
efficient bureaucracies.  Developmental statists argue that the efficiency of a bureaucracy is 
highly related to the success of the nation; successful nations have efficient bureaucracy 
(Kang, 2002, p. 61).  The bureaucracy in a developmental state is the engine that ―switch[es] 
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gears‖ from market-driven economy to government-driven one (Bagchi, 2000, p. 399).  
Bureaucracy is one of the many terms in the social science that does not have a golden 
definition.  However, the bureaucracy within the context of this thesis follows the definition 
of Kamenka (1989): ―a specialized administrative staff, trained to perform specific tasks and 
to act within the powers delegated to it or ascribed to each particular office‖ (p. 4).   
 
Developmental statists‘ insistence on the role of bureaucracy in late economic development 
traced back to Friedrich List‘s writing; List outlined an initial scheme on the developmental 
state (Evans, 1989; Leftwich, 1995).  By analyzing histories of European nations‘ economy, 
List insisted that in order to catch up to England, then leading world economy, the states on 
the European continent had to protect their markets until they could grow their markets strong 
enough to compete with England (List, 1885/1904).  List‘s idea of the role of state was 
developed more explicitly by the subsequent social scientists.   
 
Weber (1968) further described the importance and characteristics of modern bureaucracy.  
He classified rule into three different types: rational-legal, charismatic, and traditional rule, 
and the rule by a bureaucracy was the purest form of rational-legal rule.  It was the ideal 
type of political organization.  However, one of the most outstanding developmental statists, 
Cumings argued that Weber‘s concept of a bureaucracy tilted toward the Western.  Weber 
took the West as ―rational‖ and the East as ―something else‖ (Cumings, 1999, p. 84).  
Cumings‘ critique is very interesting given that the theory of developmental states originated 
from the studies on East Asia, more specifically Japan.  Weber himself concluded that 
modern and rational bureaucracy was a thing relevant only to the Western world (more 
specifically, Germany) and what Japan had was ―the feudal organization‖ (Weber, 1968, p. 
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338).  On the other hand, Johnson found Japan‘s bureaucracy rational.  It is ironic that, 
regardless of the big different point of view between Weber and Johnson on Japanese 
bureaucracy—which was the core of all developmental states discussion—many 
developmental statists have cited Weber as ―the great father figure of the modern theory of 
bureaucracies‖ (Kamenka, 1989, p. 1).  
 
The relationship between economic underdevelopment and bureaucratic inefficiency had 
come to the fore since the 1960s.  One of those studies was done by Spengler who 
underlined two roles of bureaucrats for economic development: offering aspiration to people 
and mobilizing economic factors in order to realize the aspiration (1963, p. 202).  
Gershenkron (1968a) also focused on the role of a state in late economic development 
through a comparative historical analysis between advanced European countries and Russia.  
Evans (1989) also stressed that late industrialisers had to rely on states because private 
sectors were reluctant to take risks and were not able to mobilize necessary resources by 
themselves. (p. 568).  Later, Chalmers Johnson (1982) focused on the role of the 
bureaucracy in the late development with a case of Japan‘s fast economic development.  
 
According to Johnson (1999) a bureaucracy has mainly three duties in a developmental state: 
(1) the state has to identify the industries which would have competitiveness and potential 
and choose some to be developed; (2) the state has to identify and choose the means to 
develop those selected industries; and (3) the state has to supervise economic activities in 
those designated industries and encourage their effectiveness.  Onis (1991) also underlined 
the importance of bureaucracy, especially elite economic bureaucracy in the developmental 
states, in terms of formulating, implementing and guiding overall economic activities as well 
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as avoiding conflicts between policies for fast economic development.  Another pivotal role 
of a bureaucracy in terms of the whole mechanism of economic development was the 
catalytic role of its relationship with private sectors; in order to implement effective and 
coherent development strategies, the roles of a bureaucracy which generated a consensus on 
goals and helped exchange information were crucial in successful developmental states.  
 
However, what generated the developmental bureaucracy was relatively rarely studied.  
Everett Hagen was an economist who looked for the cause of economic development in the 
―concentration of leadership‖ with ―creativity‖ (Gerschenkron, 1968 b, p. 369).  For some 
developmental state thinkers, leadership itself was just one of the constituents that form the 
developmental state.  Leftwich (1995) included ―a determined developmental elite‖ among 
six major components
2
 for the developmental state model and underlined the significance of 
the character of development elites that distinguishes the developmental states (p. 405). 
 
Even though there have been voluminous analyses on the causes of Korea‘s economic 
development, due to the predominant neoclassical tendency during the cold war era in the 
Western academia only recently has attention been shifted to the strength of the bureaucracy.  
Jang (1994/1996), one of the renowned developmental state scholars, attributed the fast 
economic development in Korea to a strong state and its industrial policies.  Even though he 
strongly embraced the significance of the state role in planning and implementing industrial 
policies, he was not sure about how Korea‘s strong bureaucracy was realized.  Other 
scholars, such as Kim (1983), observed the role of leadership carefully along with other 
contributing factors, and gave partial credit to it for Korea‘s economic development.  
                                                 
2
 1. a determined developmental elite; 2. relative autonomy; 3. a powerful, competent and insulated 
economic bureaucracy; 4. a weak and subordinate civil society; 5. the effective management of non-state 
economic interests; and 6. Repression, legitimacy and performance 
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However, again, Kim and other scholars did not provide a clear bridge between political 
leadership and the economic development of the country. 
 
 
2-3. Leadership 
 
Considering the impact of political leadership, the studies on leadership have been rarely 
conducted throughout history.  Plato has often been quoted as the initial classical scholar 
who studied leadership on Republic by illustrating four qualities of a good state—wisdom, 
courage, self-control and justice.  In a sense the qualities of a state can be translated as the 
qualities of those who govern it (Nettleship, 1963, p. 146).  However, for many classical 
scholars who seemed to have been interested in leadership, such as Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, 
Montesquieu, Rousseau and Plato, the focal interest was a good society and not leadership 
per se.   
 
Even though there has rarely been a systematic approach to the study of leadership in this 
context, desirable and undesirable leadership is an intriguing topic.  Among classical 
political scientists, only Machiavelli was interested in leadership. (Blondel, 1987).  In The 
Prince, Machiavelli illustrated how a prince should behave to be loved by his people.  The 
prince should protect and live by the ancient customs in order to be a beloved natural leader 
(Parel, 1992).  However, these codes of behaves of a prince were not a profound analysis of 
the leadership.  They were more about the desirable and normative principles that a natural 
prince should observe (Machiavelli, 1883).   
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Weber (1968), as well, focused on the idea of leadership in a chapter titled Charisma and its 
Transformation.  In the chapter, he wrote that some people were born to be leaders, with the 
―natural‖ quality called charisma while others were not.  Those people with natural 
charismatic gift can be religious, political, and other types of leader.  On the other hand, 
those who were unlucky enough to be born without this charisma were unlikely to be leaders 
(p.1111-1112).  Weber‘s approach obviously described some qualities of leaders, but still, it 
cannot be categorized as a thorough analysis on leadership.  
 
Why, then, have there been almost no theoretical analyses while many political philosophers 
were interested in and recognized the serious influence of the leaders?  For Hobbes who 
described leadership as a Leviathan, political leadership was an object that should be limited 
and tamed in order to guard people‘s freedom.  This attitude of the classical political 
philosophers had a lingering impact until the nineteenth century when monarchy was 
replaced by more participatory forms of government in most western countries.  As 
republican governments settled in, political scientists believed that systematically designed 
political structure was superior to a one-leader rule.  It was believed that the system or the 
power of institutions could control or limit leaders.  In this sense, analyzing leaders rather 
than systems or institutions seemed less logical.  At the same time, the existence of 
tyrannies or despotism has brought on the continuous unease about untamed leadership per se.  
Therefore analyses of leadership happened to focus more on how to limit and minimized the 
negative sides of leadership than on how to discover and maximize its  positive roles 
(Blondel, 1995).  
 
In this academic atmosphere, political leadership has been studied only on rare occasions.  
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According to G.D. Paige‘s (1977) survey on leadership study, only seventeen articles 
contained keywords of ‗leadership‘ of ‗leader‘ out of over 2,500 articles in American 
Political Science Review between 1907 and 1963.  Stodgill (1974) claimed that researches 
on political leaders had been ―neglected‖ together with those on labour leaders and criminal 
leaders, while leadership of military personnel, businessmen and students had been ―heavily 
researched‖ (p. 5).  The study on leadership has been even scarcer outside of the dominating 
western scholarly world.  Political leaders outside the western developed nations have rarely 
been the subjects of theoretical analysis.  In spite the significance of the role of political 
leaders in developing countries, particularly in Africa, there has only been a limited number  
of analytical works on it (Grundy, 1963). 
 
However, since the late 1960s, there has been remarkable increase in interest in how leaders 
influenced political performance (Hah & Bartol, 1983, p. 100).  Instead of how to limit the 
influence of the leader, how to utilize the positive roles of leaders has become the subject of 
analyses (Blondel, 1987).  In doing so, interest in a positional leader swayed to a behavioral 
leader. Thus, a leader became distinguished with a mere position-holder who simply sat in a 
high position.  In current academia, leadership is a force that is capable of mobilizing 
resources.  Blondel defined leadership as ―the power exercised by an individual to push 
members of the polity toward action in a particular direction [emphasis added]” (1995, p. 
290). 
 
Political leadership consists of three components, which are also very critical in terms of 
developmental state‘s leadership: (1) leadership diagnoses and identifies problems and 
strengths; (2) leadership recommends how to act in order to resolve the problems and 
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improve the strengths; and (3) leadership mobilizes resources for these actions (Tucker, 1981, 
p. 26).  On top of these elements, additional qualities are asked of the leaders in 
transforming societies: vision and will (Westlake, 2000 a).  These two additional qualities in 
transforming are especially critical to leaders in developmental states since a developmental 
state itself is the transforming state. 
 
 
2-4. Studies on Korea and Ghana 
 
It would be an over-simplistic analysis if political leadership is regarded as the only 
attributing factor to the success or the failure of economic development of a nation.  
Leadership is not perfectly autonomous from the environment that circumscribes it.  Some 
scholars such as Blondel (1987) pointed out that leadership could be only effective within the 
confinement that the environment allowed.  Along with the different types of leadership, 
there are many other considerable factors that have affected economic development in a 
specific nation: the quantity and quality of foreign aid and socio-historic values; and 
distinctive international dynamics around each nation.  Besides, these variables should not 
be disregarded in studying the role of leadership in economic development.   
 
A comparative historical economic perspective—a question of why some countries succeeded 
in economic development while others did not—has a long history (Oylaran-Oyeyinka & 
Rasiah, 2009, p. 1).  To name a few, Hamilton (1791) and List (List, 1885/1904) studied the 
underlying factors in the US‘ and European continent‘s economies respectively through the 
lens of successful England economy; Gerschenkron (1968 a) studied European economy and 
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compared it with Russian economy; Franco (1988) tried to extracted lessons from Korea‘s 
experience for Latin America ; Kim (1995) tried to find the components of Korean economic 
success that would be helpful for African economy; and Oylaran-Oyeyinka and Rasiah (2009) 
analyzed East Asian miracle and Sub-Saharan African tragedy in terms of building technical 
and learning capability.   
 
Among those, Stein (1995) indicated two risks in comparative interpretations: identification 
and reproducibility.  Identification refers to the job of pinpointing the contributors to 
successful economic performance.  It is a very puzzling task not only because it is not 
simple to find direct causes of successful economic development but also because there are 
countless indirectly intertwined variables involved.  Reproducibility means the feasibility of 
reproducing the previous success in a relatively underdeveloped place, and it should be 
approached carefully for the four following reasons: (1) the unique international environment 
that surrounds a specific nation at specific time; (2) the unique historical economic 
circumstances; (3) cultural or social values that reduce the transaction costs; and (4) a 
structure of social or political classes relating to promoting a set of policies (p.32-33). 
 
Looking at the cases of Korea and Ghana within the framework of the four factors identified 
by Stein, it would be observed that first, the international market was friendly towards 
Korean export-driven economic growth.  However, Ghana has suffered from relatively less 
favored terms of trade than Korea.  Secondly, relating to the historical economic factors, 
massive aid, which Korea received after the end of the Korean War, did not happen in Ghana.  
In fact, 80 per cent of gross domestic investment in Korea was foreign aid between 1956 and 
1962.  Thirdly, the Confucianism in Korea reduced the transaction cost in Korea‘s economic 
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development.  But in Ghana, it was not easy to find the societal attributing factors to its 
economy as Confucianism did in Korea.  Finally, in terms of the peculiarity of political 
alignment, the authoritarian regimes were possible in Korea but regimes in Ghana were less 
autonomous; Korean strong regime was possible partially due to the land reform that had the 
basis of rural elites shrank, but Ghana did not go through the similar processes. 
  
The socio-economic basis has always been one of the factors that should not be ignored in the 
historical comparative analyses for many scholars including Stein.  For instance, in the work 
of extracting ten lessons from Korean economic development for Latin America
3
, Franco 
(1988) concluded that the prime lesson from Korea would be policy making and the 
implementation process.  However, he also stressed the underlying socio-economic factors 
as the attributors to the efficient bureaucracy.  For example, he explained that Confucian 
ethics and the earned obedience from enlistment worked as the basis of the successful policy 
implication in Korea (p.17-19). 
 
 
On the other hand, instead of pointing out relatively vague cultural factors, a few scholars 
have directly related leadership or policies with economic underdevelopment.  Werlin 
(1994), one of the pioneers of comparative study between Korea and Ghana, also asserted 
                                                 
3
 Franco pointed out 10 lessons : 1. The ability to monitor and respond to outside threats and 
opportunities; 2. The ability to generate a consensus; 3. A powerful instrument to measure performance; 4. 
Political stability created by an outward-oriented strategy; 5. Rules of the game; 6. A labor policy of linking 
salary raises with increases in productivity and using a paternalistic management style; 7. The creation of think 
tanks; 8. A pragmatic mode of problem solving on obtaining foreign investment and technologies; 9. The 
flexible and quick response to external changes; and 10. Investment in human capital (p. 19-20). 
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that cultural explanations often distracted the influence of leadership and policies in 
economic development.  He found the causes of two opposite economic developments of 
Korea and Ghana in the different level of leaders‘ commitment to economic development.  
In conclusion, he ardently insisted that scholars devoted to Africa should criticize its leaders. 
(p. 222).   
 
Cartwright (1983) specifically illustrated that the leadership of Ghana, especially that of 
Nkrumah, failed because it swung from search for private investment to planned economy 
without serious commitment to economic development.  In other words, the lack of 
developmental leadership was the core hindrance in Ghana‘s economic development since its 
independence.  Many analysts, including Moss (2003), argued that what Ghana needed to 
develop was not more outside aid but more determined leadership and effective policies.   
 
 
3. Case study: Korea’s leadership and the bureaucracy of Park Chung-hee 
 
Korea was an agrarian society before it was invaded by Japan in 1910.  Japan utilized Korea 
as a new breadbasket that could fill up its insufficient rice supply. Later, during the Second 
World War, Japan introduced some military industries for its war supplies which were 
destroyed during the Korean War between 1950 and 1953.  When Park Chung-hee was 
inaugurated in 1961 as a president, Korea was the second poorest nation in Asia after 
Bangladesh.  Sakong (1993) described Korea‘s miserable condition when Park took power 
thus:  
Korea‘s rapid development began in the early 1960s, while the country was suffering 
from all the ills associated with a typical developing nation.  Widespread 
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unemployment, underemployment, and absolute poverty plagued the country.  
Savings were negligible, and dwindling foreign aid, mostly from the United States, 
primarily financed what little investment there was.  Exports were almost 
nonexistent because Korea, unlike some resource-rich developing nations, did not 
have resource-based exportable goods.  Worst of all, there was no significant 
industrial base, as agricultural dominated the economy (p. 7). 
 
When Park took power in 1961 through a military coup, he only earned a position as head of 
the Supreme Council of National Reconstruction, and at the election that was held right after 
the coup, he defeated his opponent with just a slim margin.  He promised general elections 
in two years.  Park needed to prove himself as a qualified leader in order to win the coming 
election in two years, and it was economic development that would give him the legitimacy 
he sought.  
 
In 1962, he announced the first Five-Year Economic Plan (1962-67).  Under the given 
circumstances, the plan was designed hastily and had many failings, and thus it had to be 
modified later.  However, it was enough to reflect his commitment to economic 
development to his people (Sakong, 1993, p. 48).  At the next general election in two years, 
his strong commitment to economic development and the economy that had began to 
experience faster growth gave him a landslide victory.  The means that filled the holes of his 
legitimacy was economic development, including the distribution of the fruit of the 
development.  The chase for economic development became his ―leitmotif‖ throughout his 
presidency from 1961 to1979 during which Korea had recorded over 9% annual growth rates 
(Amsden, 1989, p. 49), (Franco, Egruren, & Baughman, 1988, p. 14).  In a nut shell, he had 
to be committed to economic development for his political survival and legitimacy to be 
assured. 
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3-1. Leadership Commitments through Writings and Speeches 
 
Whatever political desire he had ultimately, the medium he chose to get his political goal was 
successful economic development, and thus Park committed himself to economic 
development.  The most efficient instrument to accomplish economic development, for him, 
was effective bureaucracy (Franco, Egruren, & Baughman, 1988, p. 15).  His commitment 
to economic development and the bureaucracy was well expressed in his speeches during his 
tenure. This subchapter studies his commitment based on some of his speeches.  How the 
commitment was realized in practice is studied in the next subchapter, 3-b; Examination via 
Relevant Policies. 
 
Park frequently expressed his determination to pursue economic development in his speeches 
and letters throughout his tenure.  From his initial days in office, he explicitly prioritized 
economic development and the bureaucracy as the engine of those economic policies.  In 
one of Park‘s earliest speeches, which was delivered right after he took power, he said that  
At this revolution, stabilizing a society and implementing economic policies are the 
utmost task of the revolutionary regime, hence determined and detailed economic 
policies are necessary….Planning and implementing will be long-term oriented….The 
administration is to offer the details of economic planning to you [people] [emphasis 
added]
4
.   
 
                                                 
4
 July 16, 1961, from a Statement on Urgent Economic Problems, obtained from the E-library of 
President Park Chung-hee; http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr 
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Park believed and claimed that only economic development could pave the way to resolve 
societal and political ills.  In order to build a stable and democratic society, he asserted, one 
needs economic development first.  This was well expressed at several points in his 
speeches;  
My wish is alleviating poverty in this land....Our enemies are poverty, corruption and 
communism.  I think these are out three common enemies…. Without preceding 
economic development, we cannot expel poverty.  Without preceding economic 
development, we cannot expel underemployment and unemployment which incubate 
corruption, and without preceding economic development, we cannot win communism 
and we cannot liberate the people in North Korea [emphasis added].
5
   
 
He believed that the primary goal of national democracy was economic independence.  
National identity or democracy was hypocrisy when not based on economic independence.
6
  
In developing countries, the focal point of politics was building economy, and democracy 
was able to be grown on the soil of economic development
7
. 
 
Park‘s commitment to economic development was not only expressed in his speeches.  His 
personal diary, which was discovered after his death, also demonstrated this commitment.  
He wrote a journal on the day he participated in the event that celebrated ‗Day of Export—
Meeting the Goal of US$ 10 Billion Export‘ in 1977.  Recollecting the original ‗Day of 
Export‘8 in 1964 when Korea‘s export had exceeded US$ 100 million for the first time, he 
                                                 
5
 July 1, 1967, from the 6
th
 President Inauguration Speech, obtained from the E-library of President Park 
Chung-hee; http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr  
6
 April 15, 1967, form radio speech the Will of Economic Independence, cited in Hong, 2005, p. 112 
7
 January 1, 968, from the New Year Message to People, cited in Hong, 2005, p. 50 
8
 The amount of Korea‘s annual export was US$ 50 million in 1962 when the 1st Economic Development 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
24 
 
conveyed his personal emotion and determination in his diary; ―we will exceed US$ 20 
billion export in 1981….We have to make strenuous efforts and gird up our loins 
more….let‘s make a definite promise of new vigorous advance with new resolution, volition 
and confidence‖.9 
 
To fulfill his commitment to economic development, Park depoliticized the Korean 
bureaucracy by granting it greater power.  He insulated the bureaucracy from political 
influences.  He believed that ―a bureaucracy should be built first in order for the fast 
economic development in backward societies on their road of modernization [emphasis 
added]‖10.  In the same vein, he added that; 
The Revolutionary Government will enact ‗the New Public Servants Law‘ in order to 
prevent a bureaucracy from wrongful political pressures and illegal interference that 
have tenaciously hindered „bureaucratic efficiency‟….The Government has done 
everything to establish a secured public servants system by protecting the statue of 
public servants….I do not doubt that establishing the system of public servants will 
increase the efficiency of the bureaucrats…[emphasis added].11 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Korea lacked capital to build industrial bases such as plants to start 
new industries, and therefore had to borrow money from abroad.  Commencing construction 
                                                                                                                                                        
Plan was initiated.  Two years later, on December 5, 1964, Korea reached US$ 100 million of export and 
Korean government set the day as the ‗Day of Export‘ with countrywide festivals.   
9
 December 22, 1977, in Park‘s diary, obtained from  
http://www.parkch.com/client/news/nw_viw.asp?idx=4553&cpage=1&b_cate=5&m_cate=23 
10
 September 6, 1963, from the Celebration Speech for Opening of the Building for Educating Central 
Government Officials, obtained from the E-library of President Park Chung-hee; http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr  
11
 September 6, 1963, from the Celebration Speech for Opening of the Building for Educating Central 
Government Officials, obtained from the E-library of President Park Chung-hee; http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr 
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of a plant meant that the government succeeded in borrowing money, and corrupted 
politicians frequented the construction site in order to extort some of the money through 
political blackmailing.  When Pohang Steel Company (current POSCO)
12
, the state-owned 
iron foundry, was under construction, Park Tae-jun, who was in charge of the construction, 
tendered a resignation because the political interference was too excessive for him to 
continue the project.  Since the size of the project of constructing Pohang Steel Company 
was the biggest in Korean history
13
, political interference and threats for getting private 
advantages from the project went to extremes.  The project manager who visited President 
Park to turn in a resignation, instead got a hand-written card of the President; ―whoever you 
are, you would better leave him alone,‖14 which, thereafter, he carried around when he had to 
meet politicians until the successful completion of the project. 
 
Park regarded a professional bureaucracy as a precondition for national development.  He 
believed that efficient execution of government policies depended on the work ethic of public 
servants, capable manpower, and improvement of bureaucratic technologies through 
education.  He often made public speeches on ameliorating working condition, and having 
bureaucrats focused on their jobs by revising of pension system.
15
  Insulating bureaucrats 
                                                 
12
 Pohang Steel Company was completed in July 1973.  Since it started running, it has never recorded 
deficit, and now POSCO (former Pohang Steel Company) is producing more than 33 million tons of steel a year 
(2008, from www.posco.co.kr).  Korea is the world‘s 5th steel producing nation and based on the steel 
produced in POSCO, Korea became the 1
st
 ship builder, the 2
nd
 electric home appliances supplier and the 5
th
 car 
makers in the world (Hong, 2005).  
13
 In order to build the Pohang Steel Company the government got US$ 100 million loan from Japan 
14
 Cited in Hong 2005, p 149-150 
15
 September 3, 1968, from a Speech on Opening the Budget, obtained from the E-library of President 
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from political influence was accomplished to increase bureaucratic efficiency.  For Park, the 
bureaucratic efficiency was achieved most by two methods: staying professional and keeping 
work ethics.  
 
In order to maintain bureaucratic professionalism, two factors were underlined: field 
researches and education.  As analysts agreed (Lee, 1968; Hong, 2005), he, himself, was a 
field researcher
16
.  Park once dismissed a Minister of Construction, and Park said he was 
fired because he did not go out to check the site of constructing the highway that connected 
Seoul-Busan.   
 
Along with the field research, Park believed that education played an important role in 
keeping the bureaucrats capable and effective.  Indeed, various education centers, including 
universities, were one of the most frequently visited places by President Park and the venue 
of many of his speeches.  His yearning for education can also be understood in the context 
that Korea lacked manpower that was highly educated enough to build its economic plans and 
pioneer new industries.  Even though many analysts have pointed out relatively well 
educated labor as one of the factors that led to Korea‘s fast economic development, Korea‘s 
labor, in 1960s, was educated only enough to manage simple labor works efficiently
17
.  In 
fact, Korea did not have enough managerial personnel or technicians who were able to take 
                                                                                                                                                        
Park Chung Hee; http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr  
16
 He was an enthusiastic learner and field researcher.  When Pohang Steel Company was under 
construction, he visited the construction site (it took more than five hours to get there from the Blue House) 
thirteen times before it was completed. 
17
 Japanese constituted over 80 percent of technicians and engineers in Korea in 1943. (Sakong, 1993, p. 
2) 
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on long-term economic and industrial planning.   
 
In order to boost economic development, manufacturing industries should be introduced.  
Park believed that institutional initiatives only could bring in those industries effectively.  
He insisted that without technological improvement, economic development was impossible. 
Park defined the underdeveloped countries as the countries lacking technology and relevant 
institutions; in order to improve the technology level, he said, an institution with powerful 
administrative and concentrated authority should be built in the first place.
18
  The strategy of 
utilizing government think-tanks for private sectors can be seen in the cases of the Economic 
Planning Board (EPC), the Korean Institution for Science and Technology (KIST), and the 
Korean Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) which are to be elaborated upon in a 
following subchapter. 
 
Along with maintaining professionalism, another point that Park ceaselessly stressed to the 
bureaucrats was work ethic and vision.  One of his favorite phrases to government officials 
was ―Let‘s not betray our people.  Let‘s make them have the confidence that we can do it 
also.‖19  Through personal letters and public speeches, he encouraged bureaucrats to act as 
models to grassroots people and to offer a vision to them; ―you [regional government officials] 
are primary workers of national activities and the spiritual leaders of your places as well as 
people‘s servants.‖20  When he made speeches or wrote letters to government officials, he 
                                                 
18
 April 21, 1967, from a Speech at the Opening Ceremony of Science Technology Administration, 
obtained from the E-library of President Park Chung-hee; http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr 
19
 Hong 2005, p. 43 
20
 March 6, 1968, at a Meeting with Regional Government Officials, obtained from the E-library of 
President Park Chung-hee; http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr  
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frequently added the expression of in the position of leading our people.  By upgrading their 
position as leaders of people, Park tried to improve their morals and their sense of duty also.  
Park often wrote autographic letters to higher government administrators and inspired their 
sense of duty.  
 
Lastly, as part of the morals and professionalism in bureaucrats, he also asked public servants 
to have a shared and integrated vision with central government.  This could be heard in his 
saying ―most of all, you have to have a vision on development of local communities by fully 
grasping government‘s goals….I expect that the economic policies discussed in last 
administrative meeting were transferred to local government offices and fully understood by 
local officials.‖21    
 
Park‘s leadership, which was committed to improving morals among the bureaucrats, is 
displayed not only in his speeches and letters but also in incentives and systems.  They are 
to be studied in the next subchapter. 
 
At domestic level, Park‘s commitment to economic development was explicitly expressed.  
He stressed the need to build insulated bureaucracy as a precondition for  economic 
development, and his words showed that he was particularly concerned with the 
professionalism and the work ethic of a bureaucracy.  
 
At the international level, when Park‘s administration planned long-term economic 
                                                 
21
 September, 17, 1971, at the Meeting with Heads of Regional Government Officials, obtained from the 
E-library of President Park Chung-hee; http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr 
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development, Korea did not have enough money and technology to kick-start its economy; it 
needed capital and technology to be brought from abroad.  However, foreign investors were 
reluctant to lend money to a country like Korea that seemed to have no hope or capability to 
repay its debts.   
 
One of the very few options Park had was getting money from Japan based on the historical 
debt Japan incurred during Japanese occupation of Korea in exchange for recovering the 
diplomatic tie between the two countries.  The diplomatic tie between the two nations was 
ceased when Korea became independent in 1945.  Yet, it was not an easy option because 
most Koreans were still suffering from the trauma of the Japanese occupation.  When the 
Government announced its plan to cease the discontinuance of diplomatic ties with Japan, 
there were enormous anti-Japanese movements in the streets across the nation.  Getting 
money from Japan in exchange for recovering broken tie with Japan was definitely a huge 
risk to his political life.  In this vein, it is understandable that Park delivered one of his 
longest speeches on the Korea-Japan Conference in 1964.  In the speech, he said; 
I understand the sentiment in current street demonstration of patriotic young students 
over the Korea-Japan Conference….But our government and I are thinking about our 
nation‘s future at the conference table….I have detailed plans to utilize the benefit of 
this conference for our nation and I will disclose them as soon as the conference is 
over.
22
    
 
Getting money from the Japanese against extreme national anti-Japan sentiment of many 
Korean whose parents and siblings were killed by Japanese and who still lived in the 
                                                 
22
 March 26, 1964, from a Special Speech on Korea-Japan Conference, obtained from the E-library of 
President Park Chung-hee; http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr 
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traumatic memories was never an easy task.  Even though Park managed to recover the 
suspended diplomatic ties between the two nations and get money and much-needed 
technologies from Japan, it was not enough.  Korea was still short of the capital required to 
boost its economy.  The US announced that it would cease the aid to Korea.  Therefore 
Park‘s government chose to include even communist countries when it could get what it 
wanted.  It was also very unconventional regarding that Korea lost one third of its national 
assets during the Korean War against communist North Korea.  However, Park asserted that 
Korea had to practically choose its international partners not only among politically neutral 
countries but also with communist countries.  In building diplomatic ties, trade and 
cooperation for economic and technical gain were at the top of the agenda.
23
 
     We have to build a bigger advocate international group through practical diplomacy 
even with communist nations.  With the military diplomacy, for our peace, we have to 
work more on our economy building.  Economy building is the basis of national 
power.  Forthcoming competition between a democratic bloc and a communist bloc 
depends on ‗development competition‘ beyond military one.  It would not be 
exaggeration winning communists means building stronger economy [emphasis 
added].
24
   
 
Considering that it was at the height of the Cold War, and that South Korea had had a war 
against Communist North Korea, this speech showed Park‘s determination to depoliticize 
Korea‘s foreign policies for its practical goal of economic development. 
                                                 
23
 September 3, 1968, from a Speech on Opening the Budget, obtained from the E-library of President 
Park Chung-hee; http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr 
24
 January 1, 1971, from a New Year Speech, obtained from the E-library of President Park Chung-hee; 
http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr 
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Park‘s speeches and letters show that he exercised leadership aimed at depoliticizing 
economic issues—domestically by building and improving a professional and moral 
bureaucracy and internationally by building diplomatic ties not limited by history or 
ideologies.  
 
 
3-2. Examinations via Relevant Policies 
 
Park‘s commitment to economic development and an insulated bureaucracy expressed in his 
words was efficiently realized in the form of corresponding policies.  Before Park took 
control, the Constitution of Korea, which was established in 1948, vested the National 
Assembly with decisive power in governmental affairs.  As soon as he took power, Park 
transformed the government from a Parliamentary system to a Presidential system.  
Moreover, through a few revisions of the Constitution, government was allowed to appoint 
one-third of Assembly membership in 1972.  Needless to say, the tenure of the appointed 
assembly members was at the discretion of President Park and depended on their loyalty to 
him (Luedde-Neurath, 1988, p. 94).   
 
That Park took the Assembly under his control was of importance both domestically and 
internationally.  Since the ‗paper tiger‘ Assembly was not able to influence or stop 
government decisions, the administration did not need to wait for the lengthy procedure of 
ratification.  Domestically, it accelerated administrative duties such as implementing 
policies and internationally, the government was able to avoid the delays and obstacles that 
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occurred in  Putnam‘s (1988) two-level games in diplomatic issues. 
 
Along with retrenching the Assembly, Park also strnegthened the bureaucracy.  The 
bureaucracy of preceding regimes was neither effective nor organized (Cheng, Haggard, & 
Kang, 1999, p. 100).  Developing a competent and efficient bureaucracy was urgent for Park 
since he took a bureaucracy to be the medium for economic development.  His strategy to 
build a developmental bureaucracy can be divided into two aspects: generating competent 
bureaucrats and restructuring system of the institutions. 
 
As many scholars pointed out as an underlying factor of its strong bureaucracy, Korea has 
had competitive civil service exams to select competent bureaucrats since around 500 B.C., 
and passing this exam has meant enormous prestige (Cheng, Haggard, & David, 1999, p. 
105).  However, the tests became loose and ineffective while Korea went through Japanese 
occupation, the following Korean War, and the chaos of nation building after the War.  Thus, 
one of the first things in Park‘s regime agenda was revising the system of the test.  The 
National Civil Service Exam Law was adopted in order to build the basis for professional 
bureaucrats across the nation.  The revision was conducted based on three principles: (1) 
open competitive tests as a base of appointments in general; (2) evaluation of performance at 
a particular post as a base of promotion; and (3) job security for all public servants (Kim & 
Leipsiger, 1993, p. 30).  New tests based on the new law enabled Park‘s regime to secure 
more competent manpower and thus to improve the efficiency of a bureaucracy in the 
beginning. 
 
Together with The National Civil Service Exam Law, Park‘s regime adopted a few more 
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measures that offered incentives to bureaucrats and to insulate them from political 
interruption.  First of all, the Provisions for New Public Servants were enacted in 1963 
aiming to secure the status of bureaucrats against political pressure.  Along with the new 
revisions that protected the status of public servants, job security and the pension guaranteed 
for civil servants were powerful merits.  Civil servants were the only class who enjoyed 
those benefits in Korea in 1960s.  These fringe benefits enabled the bureaucracy to recruit 
competent human resources despite the low salaries of public servants.   
 
Although Park insisted that the salary of public servants met the proper level to keep on 
recruiting competent public servants and let them focus on their job
25
, he had a clear 
understanding that it was not easy to reward civil servants with the insufficient salaries within 
the government‘s tight budget.  Park, who wanted to hire and maintain professional and 
competent bureaucrats, offered his own type of incentives.  Instead of compensating them 
financially, Park provided them with non-monetary gratification such as words of gratitude 
and trophies or medals for their accomplishments.  For example, an awards ceremony for 
Honorable Public Servants was held in the media spotlight every year.  Park made speeches 
that showed gratitude for award winners and he presented them with medals in person.  
Various types of non-financial incentives were one of distinctive features of Park‘s leadership, 
and these incentives did work as those that can improve the qualities and capacities of the 
bureaucrats (Weiss, 1998, p. 49-50). 
 
On the one hand, improving the level of bureaucrats in general was achievable by relatively 
                                                 
25
 September 3, 1968, from a Speech on Opening the Budget, obtained from the E-library of President 
Park Chung-hee; http://www.parkchunghee.or.kr 
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simple systematic revision such as tightened national civil servant exam or more chances of 
educating bureaucrats themselves.  On the other hand, it was a different story to secure 
highly educated ‗brains‘, i.e., PhD holders equipped with advanced technology or 
information
26
.  It was obvious that Korea needed those brains to make decisions in long-
term economic planning and to transform its industry structure.   
 
Accordingly Park initiated reverse brain drain policies to recruit high level Korean 
technicians who stayed outside of Korea.  According to the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, which was in charge of the reverse brain drain program, it was conducted by 
strict government instructions and rules.  There were governmental requirements for 
repatriation.   Scientists or technicians who had minimum two-year working career beyond 
PhD degree with Korean ancestors and who had at least five published research papers in past 
five years were the target of the government.  Various incentives were offered to attract 
repatriation including material compensation, research autonomy and technocratic authority.  
The state-led reverse brain drain brought back 553 highly educated PhD holders between 
1968 and 1980, and they mainly worked at public R & D institutes such as Korea Institute of 
Science and Technology (KIST).  KIST was founded in 1966 as a part of administrative 
reform for repatriated scientists in order for the industries that the government targeted to 
develop strategically.  They included the industries of electronics, chemistry, genetic 
                                                 
26
 According to Yoon (1992), ―as of 1967, the percentage of drain for Korean engineers, natural scientists, 
and social scientists were 80.0 percent, 97.7 percent and 90.5 percent respectively (the corresponding world 
comparisons are 30.2 percent, 35.0 percent and 34.6 percent). Significantly, aggregate overseas Korean ‗brains‘ 
outnumbered those in Korea: As of 1965, those who had a doctoral degree at home totaled 79 whereas Korean 
scientists and engineers in the United States along (although not all of them had PhD‘s) numbered 
approximately 869‖ (p. 6). 
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engineering, and computers.   The status of researchers and their works in KIST as a 
government think tank were insulated from political interference (Yoon, 1992).   
 
Aside of KIST, other institutional restructuring for economic development was undertaken 
while the government established a number of developing bureaucratic think-tanks. The 
Korean Development Institute (KDI), and the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation were two 
of the most prominent.  These public institutes supported Korea‘s exports by researching 
into foreign markets and by developing new technologies for exporting goods.  Among the 
administrative reforms, ―the most important institutional innovation‖ (Sakong, 1993, p. 26) 
was setting up the Economic Planning Board (EPB)
27
.  Park aimed at establishing an 
institution which was able to play the role of headquarters in economic development policies: 
from planning to implementing and to checking the results of the implementation.  To meet 
this need, EPB was created.   The EPB was a pilot agency that played a pivotal role in 
formulating and implementing economic policies. 
  
A pilot institution that has an autonomous power in overall economic activities is one of the 
decisive features of developmental states (Onis, 1991, p. 111).
28
  The EPB was a powerful 
pilot institution that was in charge of the whole process of planning, allotting, guiding, 
evaluating economic industrial policies.  The comprehensive role of the EPB helped avoid 
                                                 
27
 Given the limitation of time and quantity, the thesis only studies the Economic Planning Board.  
However, most analysts have put weight also on a few more institutional restructuring, including the National 
Tax Association, the Office of Labor Affairs, and Ministry of Science and Technology. 
28
 Developmental states in East Asia have had institutions that played a similar supervising role: Japan‘s 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Taiwan‘s Council for Economic Planning and Development, and 
Singapore‘s Economic Development Board. 
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conflicts between different institutions, administrations and projects.  
 
The EPB played a role of ―a super ministry‖ (Kim K. , 1983, p. 44).  First of all, the head of 
the EPB was a Deputy Prime Minister.  It gave a significant and superior status to the EPB 
since a Deputy Prime Minister received instruction directly from the President not going 
through a Prime Minister.  In other words, the head of the EPB was an acting Prime 
Minister in economic issues, and this status gave the EPB supreme degree of autonomy. 
 
Not only its status but also the function of the EPB was highly autonomous.  According to 
Kim and Leipsiger‘s compact description on the function of the EPB established in 1961;  
     the EPB combined several policy functions previously entrusted to different Ministries: 
(i) the planning function, originally located in the Ministry of Reconstruction, which 
had worked with USAID in the aftermath of the War; (ii) the power of preparing the 
government budget, which was removed from the Ministry of Finance (MOF); (iii) the 
function of collecting and evaluating the national census and other statistics which was 
taken from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  Responsibility and jurisdiction over the 
inflow of foreign capital and technology were vested in the EPB as well.  The EPB 
had three main functions: (i) it planned and formulated economic policy programs; (ii) 
it coordinated economic policies implemented by individual Ministries; and (iii) it 
evaluated policy programs implemented by individual Ministries on a continuing basis 
(p. 29). 
 
Putting economic development in a human body analogy, the EPB functioned as the brain.  
The Ministries, government institutions and even private enterprises were connected to and 
received instructions from the EPB.  The central and complete (from planning to evaluating) 
function of the EPB might have been originated from Park‘s experience from a centralized 
military system (Cheng, Haggard, & Kang, 1999, p. 101)  However, no matter where the 
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idea of EPB was originated from, one may be certain that the EPB played a decisive role in 
industrializing Korea.  According to Weiss (1988) three factors are necessary in 
bureaucratic structure of coordination for industrialization: high quality of bureaucrats, 
intelligence-gathering infrastructure and insulated pilot agencies policy coordination.  The 
EPB undoubtedly met those conditions. 
 
Along with the EPB‘s cohesive and synthesizing role in development policies, there was one 
more pivotal function of the EPB: the Monthly Economic Briefing.  This meeting was held 
at the EPB, and the participants were President Park, the heads of the Ministries, other senior 
officials and even the heads of big private enterprises.  This monthly meeting with policy 
makers and players in private sectors played one of the focal roles in effective and coherent 
economic development.  They exchanged information, generated consensus, and encouraged 
support for each other.  Park listened to the complaints about the obstacles to increasing 
exports, which was the anthem of Korea, and checked the progress at the next meeting which 
must have been a big pressure and, at the same time, motivation to the administrators.  
There also were quarterly Trade Promotion Conferences and annual briefings from senior 
officials in the Ministries which played the same encouraging and checking roles for high-
ranking government officials to meet the targets that were set previously. 
 
Even though it is true that Park‘s ―unselfish‖ leadership was committed to economic 
development and that Korea made enormous economic development during his reign, it is 
also true that his leadership was obviously a faulted one (Kang, 2002, p. 62).  Park was 
inaugurated for seven consecutive terms as a president, and he reigned for 19 years (1961-
1979).  When the Constitution limited his term in office, he amended it.  He put anyone 
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who stood against his will into jail and many labor activists who fought for better working 
conditions were tortured and killed.   Park, who pursued meritocracy for an efficient 
bureaucracy failed to clean up national betrayers who had cooperated with Japanese imperial 
governance which still generated societal conflicts in Korea.  Many scholars, including Choi 
(2002/2009), emphasized the ―militarism‖ as the feature of his regime alongsides the 
developmental state (p. 98).   However, apart from the question of whether he was 
benevolent dictator or bureaucratic authoritarian (Yoon, 1992; Choi, 2002/2009), his long 
reign of almost two decades played a positive role in Korea‘s economic development.29  His 
lengthy reign accompanied by his determined commitment to economic development and an 
insulated and efficient bureaucracy allowed him to plan, implement, evaluate, and re-plan 
long term economic development.  Through the repetitive and continuous economic 
planning cycles, Korea was able to pull itself out of abject poverty and transform its industry 
from agriculture to light industry and finally to heavy and electronic industry. 
 
 
4. Case Study: Ghana’s leadership and the bureaucracy of Kwame Nkrumah 
 
In the early 1960s when Korea was ―suffering from all the ills associated with a typical 
developing nation [emphasis added]‖ (Sakong, 1993, p. 7), the extent of Ghana‘s 
development was ―untypical of the stereotype of an under-developed economy [emphasis 
added]‖ (Omari, 1970, p. 100).   
                                                 
29
 The impact of his rule on the history of Korea‘s democracy is not as positive as that on economic 
development and it has been still very controversial.  However, the thesis limits its range only to his leadership 
on developing economy and building efficient bureaucracy. Thus the thesis does not seek for the answer of the 
question whether he was a dictator or not.  
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When Ghana became independent from Britain in 1957, it was economically the most 
advanced nation in Africa outside South Africa.  It was true that the distorted investment 
during the colonial era rendered the Ghanaian economy ―very uneven‖ (Ray, 1986).  
Railways were not extended into the north because there were almost no cash crops in there, 
and Ghana‘s economy was heavily reliant on a few commodities such as cocoa and gold.  
However, Ghana‘s social and economic infrastructures—telecommunications, roads, health 
system, education—were far more developed than those of Korea where two thirds of its 
roads were destroyed during the Korean War.  Those who observed Ghana when it was 
independent agreed that it was the country that had the most potential in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
Werlin (1994) described Ghana when it became independent thus; 
Ghana came into independence under Kwame Nkrumah in 1957 with more advantages 
than perhaps any other country in Sub-Saharan Africa.  It exported more cocoa than 
any other country and 10 per cent of the world‘s gold.  It also exported significant 
quantities of diamonds, bauxite, manganese and mahogany.  It had reserves 
amounting to an estimate US $532 million, or US $83.2 per head in 1955—enough to 
pay for one-year‘s import requirements (Fieldhouse, 1986).  Its liquid assets were 
more than seven times its long-term debt.  Ghana‘s transport infrastructure was 
considered among the best in Africa (Huq, 1989 p 62).  In addition to its economic 
assets, Ghana had at the time of independence a higher percentage of well-educated, 
professionally qualified, and technically trained and experienced people than any other 
Sub-Saharan African country (p. 208). 
 
However, when Nkrumah was ousted by a military coup in 1966, Ghana‘s economy was not 
the same as the one he inherited when he became president of independent Ghana. Taking 
every index of 1960 as a yardstick 100, between 1960 and 1966, the real value of the 
minimum wage declined to 56, monthly earnings in the private sector to 81, industrial earning 
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to 75, and the incomes of cocoa farmers dived to 34 (Fieldhouse, 1986, p. 140). 
 
The economic dynamics that Nkrumah had been through during his stay in office—starting 
from the highest condition ending at the bottom—shared a similar trace with his political 
trajectory.  The symbolic event of Ghana‘s independence as the first on the African 
continent promoted him ―from the status of a relatively unknown colonial agitator into a 
world leader‖ (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, p. 201), which was enough to implant a more 
ambitious dream in his mind.  Nkrumah and his Convention People‘s Party (CPP) were in 
power continuously from 1951, when Ghana became self-governing, until the 1966.  
Nkrumah took power and had to keep the power against existing threats to his political status.  
In the 1950s, there were strong oppositions in Ashanti regions, and also there were other 
movements in favor of joining Togo among Ewe-speaking residents in Ghana.  At the 
beginning of 1960s, he worried about the shaking basis of his supporting groups.  In order to 
secure the base of support, he had to fulfill the material expectations of his party activists 
(Killick, 1978, p. 34). 
 
 
4-1. Leadership Commitment through Writing and Speeches 
 
Scholars who have studied Ghana suggested a wide range of dimensions on Nkrumah: ―a 
perfect tool in the hands of Russians‖ (Metrowich, 1967), a nationalist as well as a socialist 
(Killick, 1978), or a ―leader, thinker and activist [who] continues to inspire a new generation 
of Africans‖ as a determined Pan-Africanist (Hadjor, 1988, p. 88).  Whichever dimensions 
are taken, one can find one thing in common; Nkrumah‘s pursuit of political aims preceded 
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economic concerns. 
  
Nkrumah‘s priority of political goals to economic ones can be effortlessly understood from 
often quoted axiom of his: ―Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things will be added 
unto it‖  (Grundy, 1963, p. 439).  He thought that underdevelopment was a result of 
politics.  In the same vein, for him, economic development was only possible on the basis of 
politics as this was evident in his saying that ―this country must progress politically—indeed 
political self-determination is the means of further realization of our social, economic and 
cultural potentialities.  It is political freedom that dictates the pace of economic and social 
progress.‖30  
 
Nkrumah‘s ultimate goal was to become a leader of Pan-Africa.  Alexander who worked for 
Nkrumah as Chief of staff for two years recalled that his boss‘s aim had been to become a 
leader of the whole Africa for a long time; Nkrumah had a strong emotional fondness to the 
Pan-Africanism and he constantly worked toward that goal. (Alexander, 1965, p. 27).   
 
The socialism that Nkrumah pursued in Ghana can be understood in the wider context of his 
conclusive goal of the united Africa
31
.  Ideologically Nkrumah was Marxist-Leninist and 
                                                 
30
 Gold Coast Weekly Review (July 20, 1955), cited in Grundy, 1963, p. 440 
31
 There are a few of opinions on Nkrumah‘s socialist position.  Alexander‘s opinion (1965) on this issue 
is interesting; ―Is Nkrumah a true communist?  Perhaps he was inclined towards it in his youth, and even in the 
days when he was working to ‗free‘ his country, but now he is an opportunist, using communist doctrine only 
when it suits his purpose and furthers his own aims. … He still retains a love-hate relationship with the United 
Kingdom … he knows that the communists will co-operate in his endeavours and undermine his enemies—that 
is, all who frustrate him in his desire to be the most important African in Africa.‖ (p. 26) 
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therefore regarded imperialism as the culprit of Africa‘s economic underdevelopment 
(Grundy, 1963, p. 453).  He took imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism that 
exploited underdeveloped nations like Ghana
32
.  On the other hand, the Soviet Union was 
regarded as the ultimate victory that destroyed Nazis who had defeated France, Belgium and 
almost Britain, the colonial powers that had extorted African countries (Ray, 1986, p. 11).  
Also, the Soviet Union was against the colonial powers and its fast economic and military 
development in 1960s was impressive enough for Nkrumah to take it as his path to Pan-
Africanism.   
 
Nkrumah overtly proclaimed his political ideology of Pan-Africanism and socialism, yet he 
understood that he needed capital from western countries to rebuild the infrastructures of 
Ghana for its economic development.  The critical fallacy of Nkrumah‘s leadership in terms 
of economic development was the fact that his economic policies lacked consistency and 
predictability while his ideological belief swung widely from pro-Western to pro-socialism 
domestically and internationally
 33
.  Economic gains were sometimes foregone for the sake 
of political benefits.  In a nut shell, Nkrumah did not distinguish between political agendas 
and economic gains, and when they conflicted, economic gains had to be sacrificed.  
 
At the domestic level, Nkrumah prioritized political independence, however he acutely 
                                                 
32
 Nkrumah, 1963, p. 22 
33
 There has been a controversy on Ghana‘s ideological shift.  Fitch and Oppenheimer (1966) asserted 
that Ghana under Nkrumah should be considered two different nations: a pro-western Ghana between 1975 and 
1961 and a pro-socialist Ghana between 1961 and 1966.  On the other hand, Killick (1978) regarded Nkrumah 
more of a socialist.  Gerund argued that his socialism was just another name of anti-colonial nationalism (cited 
in Killick 1978).  
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understood that political independence was senseless without economic independence; before 
Ghana obtained full independence, he wrote in his autobiography that;  
The first objective then is political independence,…Once this freedom is gained, a 
greater task comes into view.  All dependent territories are backward in education, in 
agriculture and in industry.  The economic independence that should follow and 
maintain political independence demands every effort from the people, a total 
mobilization of brain and manpower resources….Unless it is, as it were, ‗jet-propelled‘, 
it will lag behind and thus risk everything for which it has fought [emphasis added].
34
    
 
In his early days in power, he seemed to grasp the clear vision of the advanced economy in 
Ghana; he said in 1960 that ―the Government will embark upon an intensified program of 
industrialization which, with the diversification and merchandization of agriculture, will 
provide the main basis for the transformation of the economic and social life of the 
country.‖35  However, as it is inferred in his provision of relatively unclear future of its 
economy, what lacked in his policies were detailed sub-plans and reliable government 
institutions that could implement the policies, which is studied in the subsequent subchapter: 
Examinations via Relevant Policies. 
 
To fulfill his aims of the economic independence and development, Nkrumah thought Ghana 
should become a socialist society because ―capitalism [was] too complicated a system for a 
newly independent nation.‖36  Even though Nkrumah had had a socialist view, it had not 
been noticeable while he was fighting for independence.  However, after independence, 
Nkrumah‘s real aims toward socialist society began to emerge. 
                                                 
34
 Nkrumah K. , 1957/1971, p. x 
35
 July 4, 1960, cited in Obeng 1997, vol.1, p. 96 
36
 Nkrumah K. , 1957/1971, p. x 
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Nkrumah‘s swinging attitudes toward domestic private industries exemplified his ―extremely 
ambivalent‖ views. (Killick, 1978, p. 37).  Initially his government supported private 
operators buying publicly owned commercial enterprises.  However, in 1960, Nkrumah said 
that private businesses ―must now stand on their own feet‖37, and he took back various 
government measures that encouraged entrepreneurships before.  Later Nkrumah said more 
explicitly that ―we would be hampering our advance to socialism if we were to encourage the 
growth of Ghanaian private capitalism in our midst.‖38  It was not only about the ideological 
road to a socialist society; Nkrumah, indeed, feared emerging capitalist class in Ghana 
(Fieldhouse, 1986, p. 144; Killick, 1978, p. 37).  The unpredictable government policies on 
a private business sector concluded in a way that Ghanaian private companies were doomed 
to remain to small-scale which hindered the international competitiveness of Ghanaian 
companies. 
 
Nkrumah‘s urge to attract foreign investment and his furious statements against colonialism 
were also not consistent.  His conflicting positions kept giving confusing signals to foreign 
investors such that Ghana finally failed to secure enough capital it needed to develop its 
economy.  
 
Nkrumah‘s vision about Ghana was a welfare state with productive infrastructures for a 
socialist society.  He promised his people that; ―Roads, river communications, harbor 
facilities and other communications will be developed in accordance with the present 
                                                 
37
 October 10, 1960, Ghanaian Times, cited in Killick, 1978, p. 37 
38
 March 11, 1964, National Assembly Debate, cited in Killick, 1978, p. 37 
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plan….Our goal is to achieve a free universal primary and middle school education within the 
shortest possible time….The Government has embarked on a complete reorganization of the 
health and medical services of the country.‖39  In order to deliver those promises Ghanaian 
government desperately needed money and Ghana did not generate enough capital within its 
nation.  For these reasons, Nkrumah perceived the importance of foreign investment very 
acutely.   
 
In 1960, in the welcoming speech for the Prime Minister of England, he vividly mentioned 
the need of foreign capital for Ghana‘s economic development and its strong will to stay 
unaligned in the Cold War polar system for the development of his country; ―During the next 
five years we will leave no stone unturned to find the funds we need to give full effect to our 
Second Development Plan.  For this to be achieved, we need the full support, both financial 
and material, of our friends overseas‖40  Obviously, here, in this welcoming speech for the 
Prime Minister of England, he referred to England in the expression of our friends overseas.  
Nkrumah knew that western countries had more money Ghana could borrow, thus he added 
that ―we are happy to observe in recent months that the ice of the cold war is beginning to 
thaw….Ours is one of positive non-alignment.  It is essential for the development of our 
country and for the rest of Africa that we should take this stand‖.41  Even after Nkrumah 
turned Ghana relatively obviously towards socialism in 1961, he had to send friendly signals 
to the imperialists that he had condemned.  Nkrumah desperately needed foreign investment 
or foreign aid. About a quarter of his government‘s Seven-year Plan needed to be financed by 
                                                 
39
 July 4, 1960, cited in Obeng 1997, vol.1, P 96-97 
40
 January 9, 1960, cited in Obeng, 1997, vol.1, p14-15 
41
 January 9, 1960, cited in Obeng, 1997, vol.1, p14-15 
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foreign capital.   
 
On the one hand, he sent friendly signals to foreign investors who had capital that Ghana 
needed to build a welfare state that he promised to his people.  On the other hand, he 
impeached the formal colonialist nations and condemned their renewed investment as a new 
form of colonialism.  The monetary aid from international organizations was also regarded 
as an evil trick of the colonialists.  In his book Neo-colonialism, Nkrumah asserted as such; 
This new wave of predatory invasion of former colonies operates behind the 
international character of the agencies employed: financial and industrial consortia, 
assistance organizations, financial aid bodies and the like.  Friendly co-operation is 
offered in the educational, cultural and social domains, aimed at subverting the 
desirable patterns of indigenous progress to the imperialism objectives of the financial 
monopolists.  These are the latest methods of holding back the real development of 
the new countries.
42
 
 
     Another technique of neo-colonialism is the use of high rates of interest….Thus ‗aid‘ 
turns out to be another means of exploitation, a modern method of capital export under 
a more cosmetic name.  Still another neo-colonialist trap on the economic front has 
come to be known as ‗multilateral aid‘ through international organizations.43 
 
Considering that the World Bank, the US and the UK were financing the external costs of the 
Volta project in Ghana at this time, what Nkrumah wrote in the book did not sound like the 
voice of the political leader of Ghana.  His contradictory attitudes toward western capital 
gave ambiguous signals to investors and ended up failing to provide the necessary funding to 
build Ghana‘s economy.  Some even described the ambivalent attitudes of Nkrumah as 
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 Nkrumah, 1965, p. 50 
43
 Nkrumah, 1965, p. 242 
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―almost schizophrenic‖ (Rooney, 1988, p. 169).  
 
Outside Ghana, ‗a united Africa‘ was the ―cardinal objective‖ in Nkrumah‘s policy (Adjei, 
cited in Lengum, 1962, p. 46).
44
  Nkrumah assumed the Balkanization of the continent as 
the most threatening danger in Africa
45
, and Pan-Africanism was his old ambition.  He had 
clear Pan-African aims since his days at Lincoln University (Rooney, 1988, p. 140), and 
started to work on this ambition with the Ghana-Guinea Union in 1958.  The following year 
Liberia joined the union at Sanniquellie and the three nations, initiated by Nkrumah, 
announced the Sanniquellie Declaration which Nkrumah valued highly.  In the Declaration, 
Nkrumah urged African nations to join a union of African states and to tackle the obstacles in 
building the still visionary union together.
46
  For Nkrumah, Ghana‘s independence and its 
economic prosperity were meaningless without the complete liberation of the whole African 
continent.
47
  He was committed to sacrifice the resources of Ghana for a liberated and united 
Africa (Lengum, 1962).  This would be a great and necessary commitment as a leader of 
Pan-Africa, but this grandiose goal was not beneficial to the people and economy of Ghana.  
His vision and leadership was ―romantico-spectacular‖ at the expense of the economy of his 
own nation (Kirk-Greene, 1986). 
 
                                                 
44
 Ako Adjei was Ghana‘s Foreign Minister who spelled out Nkrumah‘s ideas in adopting Sanniquellie 
Declaration.  
45
 August 6, 1960, cited in Obeng, 1997, vol.1, p126 
46
 Statement by the president of Ghana Osagyfo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, on the Sanniquellie Declaration, 
cited in (Lengum, 1962, p. 164) 
47
 Kwame Nkrumah at Parliament House in July 4, 1960 
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4-2. Examinations via Relevant Policies 
 
For two years after independence, Ghana did not have actual economic development plans 
(Fitch & Oppenheimer, 1966, p. 90).  Even though there were two consecutive Five Year 
Development Plans, they were little more than a mere name.  Ghana‘s economic policies 
were based on the Report on Industrialization and the Gold Coast written by W. Arthur 
Lewis in 1953.  He was very influential in economic policies in Ghana and his strategies 
were based on passive government and foreign capital.  Ghana failed to attract enough 
foreign capital to go by the plan of him and the economy of Ghana started to fall as foreign 
reserves began to decline.   
 
After the failure, the second Five Year Development Plan was introduced in 1959.  However, 
the plan did not contain organized planning.  According to Fitch & Oppenheimer (1966), 
The Plan had been drawn up with a ‗shopping list‘ technique.  Since the state had no 
control over the means of production, the question of how to generate the maximum 
surplus for development purposes could not even be raised.  Instead, the various 
ministries simply suggested lists of whatever projects they thought might be both 
useful and economically feasible.  The planners were then limited to dropping or 
modifying proposals in order to keep within the total budget (p. 90). 
 
The two Five Year Development Plans were merely nominal ones, and the economy of 
Ghana had been deteriorating since its independence partially due to external shocks and 
mainly due to mismanagement of the economies.  In the mean time, Nkrumah‘s leaning 
toward Communism became more and more undisguised.  Right after his return from his 
visit to Eastern European countries in 1961, Nkrumah pronounced the abandonment of the 
Second Five Year Development Plan which was underway.  Impressed by the fast economic 
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growth of the Soviet Union, Nkrumah discarded the Second Five Year Plan without any 
official announcement of why it was scrapped.
48
  
 
For a new economic plan that would replace the deserted one, a National Planning 
Commission was formed and Nkrumah took the place of Chairman.  The Commission was 
in charge of preparing the new Seven-Year Plan.   It would not be a coincidence that the 
Seven Year Economic Plan of the Soviet Union was in progress when Nkrumah introduced 
Ghana‘s new Seven Year Plan. 
 
Comparing the previous Second Five Year Plan whose aim had been a welfare state, the new 
Plan was based on socialism.  However, as it could be heard in his public speeches, there 
was also some level of conflict between the communist political agenda and economic 
attentions (Omari, 1970, p. 104).  Some experts on Ghanaian economic history also pointed 
out that the rationale of the new Plan was building an economic framework for the attainment 
of the Convention Peoples Party‘s basic socio-political goals along with industrialization for 
resolving a high unemployment problem.  (Killick, 1978, p. 46; Green, 1965, p. 253).  The 
new plan explicitly linked economic activities with socialist political goals.  However, 
unfortunately, it did not yield the anticipated results.  Facing continuous economic failure, 
Nkrumah withdrew into his political kingdom deeper and deeper. 
                                                 
48
 Fitch & Oppenheimer (1966) offered another reason why the Second Plan was scrapped.  According 
to them, ―Increasing balance of payments deficits, dwindling reserves, and failure to attract foreign investment 
forced Ghana to search for a new development strategy.  Not ‗flirtation‘ with socialist planning, not hostility to 
British entrepreneurs operating in Ghana, but complete reliance on the conventional wisdom reflected in the 
Lewis approach had led Ghana into the predicament.‖ (p. 91) 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
50 
 
 
The political pursuit of Nkrumah and his party
49
 was one of the most fundamental obstacles 
in the economic development of Ghana.  The other challenge in its development was a 
bureaucracy which was under the influence of politics.  It hindered effective planning and 
implementing of economic policies.   
 
Facing pressures from various opposing or conflicting groups Nkrumah basically chose to 
strengthen his inner circle, instead of resolving the problems with them, in order to protect his 
power against external groups.  The more severe the conflicts, the stronger he tried to build 
his groups not only within his party but also within the bureaucracy.  The distinction 
between the party and administrations became increasingly vague (Killick, 1978).  For 
instance, the Ga tribe had dissatisfaction with Nkrumah government because Ga people had 
not been represented in the government.  They asked the proportionately proper number of 
seats in the government, and to mobilize their political power, they founded a political party.  
Nkrumah, instead of resolving problems with them, took it as threat and gave more power to 
his Convention People‘s Party (CPP).  The CPP established a new law that nullified a party 
based on regional tribes.  By this new law, the party of Ga people was banned but their 
dissatisfaction remained while their anger increased. 
 
Another factor that hindered an efficient bureaucracy from developing was his inclination 
toward socialism.  When Nkrumah decided to embark on socialism he realized that ‗You 
can‘t build socialism without socialists‘ (Nkrumah, cited in Rooney, 1988, p. 139).  Thus he 
                                                 
49
 Omar (1970) pointed out that the prime concern of Nkrumah and the assemblypersons in the CPP was 
ideology and the party itself (p. 105). 
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commenced the task of educating young people in the party with socialist ideology.  
Nkrumah appointed his ideological comrades to high posts in government, which was natural 
in his logic; in order to transform Ghana into a socialist society, a person subscribing to 
socialist philosophy should take the leading post rather than more practical and qualified non-
socialists.  The political appointment later brought about a huge brain drain that hurt 
Ghana‘s international competitiveness. 
 
As anticipated, this mismanagement style resulted in an incapable and inefficient bureaucracy.  
Also, bureaucrats did not wield the essential power they needed.  There was nothing 
insulating power in the system that could protect bureaucrats from political influence.  
Jackson & Rosberg (1982) described this situation, rather comically by suggesting that ―even 
the government ministries came under the influence of party ‗barons‘ [emphasis original]‖ (p. 
207).  As a result, the overall level of effectiveness of a bureaucracy was so low that it could 
not implement planned policies. 
 
Another problem that made the Ghanaian bureaucracy inefficient was brain drain.  Even 
though the government introduced an ‗Exit Permit Bill‘ in November 1963, a significant 
number of the most senior civil servants left Ghana by 1966, including Executive Secretary 
of the Economic Commission for Africa and Deputy Secretary-General of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat.  Some of them left Ghana because the appointments of 
important government posts were based on political ideology or loyalty.  Many highly 
capable former senior officials failed to gain appointments because they were not socialists.  
Some deserted or moved out of their homeland because they felt their lives threatened by the 
displeasure of Nkrumah toward them. (Omari, 1970, p. 107).  
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At the international level, Nkrumah‘s ambivalent views on foreign private investment were 
well reflected in related policies whose inconsistency finally ended up failing to secure much- 
needed investment.  For example, a Capital Investment Act was passed in 1963, and the Act 
offered a variety of fiscal and other ranges of benefits to potential investors.  However, 
Nkrumah, who feared financial dependency, added strings to the investment.  The 
conditions included that the government had to have a priority to buy shares of foreign 
private companies; that the foreign companies should be co-owned with Ghanaian 
government;, and that 60 per cent of the profits that were earned in Ghana should be 
reinvested in the country.  
 
These strict conditions undoubtedly failed to attract anticipated foreign investments, and 
unfortunately, Nkrumah‘s newly-found international partners of socialism would not help 
him out of this dilemma.  Despite Nkrumah‘s support and affection, economic cooperation 
or trading with the socialist nations were not necessarily beneficial to Ghana.  Nkrumah 
tried to persuade his people saying that the aid and loans from the socialist countries were 
more beneficial to Ghana‘s economy.50  However, those socialist countries did not have 
sufficient capital to lend.  Also, the deals made with them were mostly ineffective because 
they were not aware of the situations in Ghana enough to give effective help, and because 
their intentions underlying the economic deals were also political.  Omari observed and 
presented the reality of the economic cooperation between Ghana and socialist nations; 
Trade agreements with East European countries were generally made from political 
motives.   They often acted unfavorably on Ghana‘s balance of payments because 
Ghana in many cases provided these countries with a considerable quantity of her own 
                                                 
50
 Nkrumah, 1965, p. 243 
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products, and was receiving in return goods that were neither to the same real value nor 
suitable for Ghana….One East European country supplied Ghana with several hundred 
‗agricultural‘ tractors which turned out to be snow-ploughs, and were therefore useless 
[emphasis added]‖ (p. 108). 
 
The socialist nations that Ghana built economic ties with were as helpful as the snow-ploughs 
to Ghana.  Ghana received somewhat unhelpful assistances in the form of products, as it can 
be seen above, and sometimes it had to pay back with foreign currency.  These 
economically unproductive ties and agreements with socialist counterparts put Nkrumah into 
further difficulty.  In order to fill the gap created in the economically unnecessary political 
ties with socialist nations, to meet the expectation of his supporting groups, and to build the 
economic basis of Ghana, Nkrumah had to rely on the western ‗imperialists‘ even more than 
before. 
  
For Nkrumah, if socialism was the strategy, Pan-Africanism was the principle.  Pan-
Africanism was the ground and the ultimate goal of his foreign policies.  As soon as he 
became the head of independent Ghana, Accra became a center of Pan-Africanism.  In 1958, 
Nkrumah brought outstanding Pan-Africanist George Padmore
51
 to Ghana.  Nkrumah 
intended to give him a position of advisor but faced big opposition of within his party; 
Padmore was from West Indies and the congress people would not like to have a foreigner in 
their government.  However, eventually, Nkrumah outmaneuvered the complaints and 
established the Bureau of African Affairs, and Padmore was in charge of the newly installed 
                                                 
51
 According to Hadjor (1988), George Padmore was one of those who advocated Pan-Africanism ―as 
political response to racial oppression and colonial domination, ‖ and he developed Pan-Africanism into a 
―coherent ideological perspective‖ (p.88).  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
54 
 
bureau.  In the same year Ghana also held conferences for Pan-Africanism, including the 
All-African People‘s Conference for boosting the ideology of one Africa and Nkrumah 
initiated founding the African Affairs Secretariat and the All-African Trade Union Federation 
(Hadjor, 1988). 
     
Nkrumah never gave up on Pan-Africanism but it was a visionary and difficult road toward 
one Africa.  Nkrumah dedicated excessive and passionate support.  His government poured 
millions of pounds of Ghana‘s once-the-biggest foreign reserves into the vision of the African 
Union with a single parliament (Omari, 1970, p. 123).  Nonetheless, it was too grandiose a 
vision for him to materialize.  By 1962, he became the only advocate who worked for the 
vision.  Every African nation, except Nkrumah‘s Ghana, had to handle exceeding domestic 
problems of its own.  Also, the peculiarities of each nation that were rendered from different 
colonial experiences and from diverse interests walled the path to one Africa.  In 1963, 
Nkrumah‘s ambitious dream ended with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which 
was a contradiction of his Pan-Africanism (Hadjor, 1988, p. 93), to the extent that the OAU 
would always be an organization of individuals and never an individual unit of itself.   
 
Although it is true that Nkrumah pursued his political ideology before economic development 
of Ghana, his accomplishment should not be underestimated.  He played a pivotal role in 
Ghana‘s independence and led the country to be the first independent nation in the African 
continent.  On top of that, Nkrumah‘s plan for building socio-infrastructures such as hospital 
and clinics, schools and universities rendered Ghana an African nation with relatively high 
level of education and health system (Ray, 1986, p. 13).   Also, his determined and 
persistent actions for Pan-Africanism have inspired many African thinkers and activists 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
55 
 
including South Africa‘s Robert Sobhukwe.  However, he had ―basically moralistic and 
messianic orientation to leadership‖ (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, p. 203). While he was 
planning and working for his hardly achievable political vision, the people in Ghana had to 
survive deteriorated economics and mismanaged or unmanaged bureaucracy.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Ghana, the first independent nation in the African continent, was one of the most prosperous 
nations on the continent when it became independent in 1957.  As many scholars and 
commentators have pointed out, around the time when Ghana got independent, its economic 
situation was not worse than that of Korea.   However, a half century later, while the GNI 
per capita of Korea increased by fortyfold exceeding US$20,000, Ghana‘s economy still stays 
about the same; Ghana‘s GNI per capita was US$ 490 in 1957, and it is US$ 670 now.   
 
The thesis explains these opposite directions of economic development between Ghana and 
Korea from a respective of developmental states; Korea transformed itself as a developmental 
state in 1960s, while Ghana failed to do so.   Considering that the basis and core of the 
developmental states is a developmental bureaucracy and its interventionism, the failure of 
transforming itself to a developmental state can be translated as the failure of securing a 
developmental bureaucracy.  In this vein, Ghana‘s less successful economic development 
should find its cause the answer to the question of why Ghana failed to have an efficient and 
competent bureaucracy.    
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The thesis hypothesized that a developmental bureaucracy was able to be delivered by 
developmental leadership; a leader, who was committed to economic development, 
depoliticized economic issues and built an insulated and autonomous bureaucracy.  Building 
a developmental bureaucracy is the prime component of depoliticizing tasks for successful 
and effective economic development.   In order to examine this hypothesis, the thesis 
employed two cases: Korea under the leadership of Park Chung-hee and Ghana under 
Kwame Nkrumah.  
  
As Stein (1995) pointed out, there have been a range of differences between Ghana and 
Korea such as;1. International market was less favorable to Ghana than to Korea; 2. Korea 
received massive aid right after the Korean War in 1953 which did not happen in Ghana; 3. 
Different socio-economic basis such as Confucianism might have worked as a positive 
factors in Korea;, and 4. The regime in Korea was relatively stronger than that in Ghana from 
different historical experiences.  It is true that these factors should be considered not only in 
studying the economic histories of Korea and Ghana but also in examining the leadership of 
the two countries since leaders are also ―prisoners‖ of the environment (Blondel, 1987, p. 4). 
 
However, this thesis focused more on the role of leadership in generating an insulated and 
autonomous developmental bureaucracy based on the fact that the economic level of two 
countries were just about the same—the GNI per capita of US$490 for Ghana and US$ 491 
for Korea—when both leaders, Nkrumah and Park, took power, and that after the reign of 
both leaders, two countries followed the opposite paths of economic development. 
 
The thesis approached at two different levels when it studied the role of leadership in 
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depoliticizing economic policies and in building a strong and autonomous bureaucracy: 
domestically and internationally.  First, domestically, building a developmental bureaucracy 
insulated from political interventions was critical because an empowered and insulated 
bureaucracy was able to work for long-term economic policies avoiding pork-barrel politics.  
Internationally, depoliticizing economic issues was also very critical; in order to obtain 
necessary capital and technology from abroad for economic development, a developmental 
leader had to depoliticize foreign policies in choosing international partners based on 
economic benefit not on political ideology.   In addition, the hindrance occurred in two-
level game (Putnam, 1988) was avoidable due to the strengthened bureaucracy which was in 
charge of relevant foreign policies. 
 
In order to examine the domestic and international roles of leadership, the thesis studied the 
leaders‘ commitments which were expressed in words through autobiography, speeches, 
letters, personal journals, memos and books they had written.  The commitments to 
economic development and to a strong bureaucracy were mainly studied.  In addition, the 
commitments, which were articulated in words, were investigated through relevant policies to 
check the truthfulness of the aforementioned commitments. 
 
In studying Park‘s leadership in Korea, first of all, the thesis outlined a number of cases that 
showed his strong commitment to economic development.   When he took power by 
military coup in 1961, he had to prove his capacity as a leader before the scheduled election 
in two years, and rapid economic development was the only way that would grant him 
legitimacy.  Therefore, he introduced a government-led economic development plan and 
worked on implementing it.  Under his development plan, the economy showed signs of 
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significant improvement, which led to a landslide victory in his 1963 bid for election.  
Building on his initial success, he remained dedicated to rapid economic development 
throughout his nineteen year tenure as President.  A large number of Park‘s speeches 
explicitly outlined economic development as the top priority of his agenda.  In such a speech, 
he described economic development as the ultimate solution and a necessary precondition to 
resolving other urgent and severe problems including poverty, corruption and communism—
known as the three common enemies of the nation.  He urged that only by first addressing 
economic development could other predicaments be resolved. 
 
Also, he committed to building a strong bureaucracy as the most effective medium to 
establish the fast economic development he needed.  Several parts of speeches and writings 
showed his determined will to build an insulated bureaucracy.  For example, in his memos 
to secretariats in the Blue House, he wrote them not to disclose their opinions on government 
issues in public, because it would be translated as an abuse of their authority against the 
bureaucrats in relevant administrations.    
 
Park believed the insulated bureaucrats‘ competency could be maintained in two ways—
professionalism and work ethic. Since he regarded the bureaucrats the frontrunners that 
should lead the people of Korea as well as its economic development, securing qualified 
bureaucrats—professionally and morally—was of great importance.  His determination to 
have professional bureaucrats with a healthy work ethic could be heard in several parts of his 
speeches and letters.  In order to keep the bureaucrats professional, Park insisted on the 
necessity of field research and education, and to maintain high moral standards, he tried to 
implant the sense of duty in them as leaders of Korean people and of Korea‘s economic 
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development. 
 
At the international level, getting capital that was desperately needed for its economic 
development was the most important task.  Facing the reluctance of international lenders, 
Park decided to receive money from Japan in exchange for rebuilding the ties of two nations 
that had been ceased after Korea‘s independence.  However, it was a huge political risk for 
him because Koreans had still not fully recovered from the trauma of the harshness of 
Japanese occupation.  His Speech on Korea-Japan Conference illustrated his commitment to 
depoliticize foreign diplomacy explicitly.  In the speech, he insisted that the government 
already had a detailed plan to utilize the money, which would be given by the Japanese 
government.  He also asserted that to build its economy Korean had to develop diplomatic 
ties with foreign countries, even if those countries were former enemies hated for past 
atrocities.  Furthermore, he expressed his willingness to include former Communist enemies 
as Korea‘s new international partners for practical benefits. 
 
Those commitments disclosed in his words were witnessed in relevant policies.  First of all, 
he transformed the system of government from an Assembly-centered to a Presidential one.  
On top of that, by 1972, one third of Assembly membership went to the appointed by the 
President and the appointment of the one third made based on the continuous loyalty to the 
President; for them to vote against government policies was purely impossible.   Both 
transformations dramatically decreased the political influence of the Assembly and increased 
the power of the bureaucrats. 
 
Also, in order to secure competent manpower in a bureaucracy, a revised National Civil 
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Service Exam was adopted.  The status of capable bureaucrats selected by the new strict 
exams was insulated by the newly enacted Provision for New Policy Servants.  Park utilized 
various types of nonfinancial rewards to public servants in order to motivate them, such as 
writing gratitude letters or presenting medals to award winners in person in the annual 
Honorable Public Servants Contest.  These were alternatives to boost the working spirit of 
public servants in an underdeveloped country like Korea with a tight budget, and they helped 
spawn committed and capable bureaucrats.   
 
One of the most critical features of Park‘s leadership in utilizing bureaucrats was establishing 
government think-tanks.  The government-led reverse brain drain initiatives brought in 
highly educated technicians who stayed abroad, back to Korea.  Also, researches from the 
think-tanks were insulated from political influence as well as the status of the institute.  
They became new technocrats who led the Korean industrial revolution successfully.   
 
Along with those government think-tanks, the role of the Economic Planning Board (EPB) 
was pivotal in Korea‘s economic development.  Most developmental statists have taken the 
role of a pilot institution as one of the most imperative and distinctive aspects of a 
developmental state (Onis, 1991, p. 111).  The EPB was the powerful pilot institution that 
was in charge of the whole process of planning, allocating, and evaluating economic policies.  
It was a supra ministry in its status and function.  A Deputy Prime Minister who received 
instructions directly from the President was the head of the EPB, and it coordinated economic 
planning and budgeting of other ministries. 
 
On the other hand, Ghana‘s Kwame Nkrumah was the typical case that the leader failed to 
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depoliticize economic issues resulting in economic disaster.  Contrary to Park‘s logic that 
economic development should be preceded in order to heal other ills of society such as 
corruption and human indignity, Nkrumah thought that politics could resolve the problem of 
economic underdevelopment.  This was well noted in his frequently quoted axiom. 
  
The political path Nkrumah chose was socialism.  However, Nkrumah‘s socialism was 
closer to the strategy for the principle of Pan-Africanism—the ultimate goal of his rather than 
pure socialism as a principle.  Unlike his constant determination regarding Pan-Africansim, 
his speeches and policies on socialism were sometimes ambivalent, and this ambiguity lent 
great unpredictability to Ghana‘s economic policies domestically and internationally.  
Nkrumah, at the beginning, supported boosting domestic private businesses in Ghana, but 
later, he gave speeches that hinted at suppressing private sectors.  He explained that 
capitalism was too complex to implement in a newly independent country like Ghana.  Also 
he expressed his ill feeling against private business, stating that supporting private capitalism 
would hinder the advance to socialism in Ghana.  Concerning his statements and domestic 
policies toward socialism, some scholars indicated that the socialism in Ghana was not just 
his ideological propaganda; Nkrumah feared emerging capitalist class in Ghana and took 
them as threat to his power (Fieldhouse, 1986, p. 144; Killick, 1978, p. 37).  
 
Nkrumah‘s ambivalence originated from the conflict between his political belief of socialism 
and his acute understanding that Ghana needed economic support from the ‗imperialists‘.  
Nkrumah, a Marxist-Leninist, took imperialism as the climax of capitalism, and, on the other 
hand, the fast economic and military growth of the Soviet Union in 1960s seemed the right 
path for Ghana and especially for his dream of Pan-Africanism.  However, Ghana‘s 
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economy and the capital projects such as Volta River scheme which required funding from 
abroad, and Nkrumah‘s international ideological comrades were not very helpful to Ghana.  
Thus, he had to send friendly signals to imperialists that he had condemned, since about a 
quarter of his government‘s Seven-year Plan needed to be financed by foreign capital.  
Killick (1978), one of the most outstanding Ghanaian experts, asked; ―how to reconcile these 
facts with the views he published in Neo-colonialism?‖ (p. 38)   
 
Nkrumah‘s ultimate political goal was to be the leader of United Africa.  Even though he 
did not show this ambition until he became the first Prime Minister of independent Ghana in 
1957, Pan-Africanism was his old ambition; he had clear Pan-African aims since his days at 
Lincoln University.   Right after he took power, he disclosed his vision of Pan-Africanism 
and Accra became the center of Pan-Africanism.  
 
While the leader was bustling about Pan-Africansim, Ghana, practically, did not have serious 
economic development plans since its independence before Nkrumah embarked on the 
socialist Seven-Year Plan in 1961.   Even though there were two Five-Year Plans before the 
Seven-Year Plan, the two plans did not control almost any economic activities and they were 
close to a collection of the ideas and policies from various ministries.  Right after his trip to 
East Europe, Nkrumah deserted the Five Year Plan that was in progress without official 
comments on the abandonment.  The new Seven-Year Plan replaced the previous welfare-
oriented plan, and the ideal background of the plan was openly socialistic.  However, the 
plan did not harmonize the socialist political basis and practical economic intentions, and 
finally failed to yield anticipated results. 
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The failure of the economic plan partially resulted from a general incapability of bureaucrats 
who could not implement public policies effectively (Roseberg, 1982, p. 207).  When 
Nkrumah appointed the heads of government institutions, their sociological ideology was 
counted before their capabilities.  Nkrumah wanted to appoint the heads who would educate 
people into socialist ideology, and this resulted in a critical brain drain in Ghana, forcing a 
number of competent, high level bureaucrats to leave Ghana.  On top of that, a bureaucracy 
was never insulated from political interferences (Rosberg, 1982, p. 207).   
 
Nkrumah dedicated wealth and power of Ghana to Africa‘s unity (Lengun, 1962, p. 44).  
Pan-Africanism was the goal that had to be met at the expense of Ghana‘s own prosperity. 
Overall economic situation deteriorated since he took power while he was working on his 
political ambition. However, his vision of Pan-Africanism was also doomed facing  the 
flagging support of other African leaders.   
 
Even though Park‘s developmental leadership successfully boosted Korea‘s economy, it is 
also true that his leadership had flaws; Park stopped the progress of Korea‘s democracy by 
inaugurating himself as the president of Korea seven times in a row and reigning for 19 years.  
His militarism suppressed the development of human rights and many activists were dragged 
to jail, tortured and killed. 
 
Also, even though Kwame Nkrumah failed to develop Ghana‘s economy, his achievements 
should not be underestimated.  He played a critical role in Ghana becoming the first 
independent country on the African continent, and his commitment to a welfare state 
rendered Ghana an African nation with relatively high level of education and a good health 
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system (Ray, 1986, p. 13).  On top of that, his passionate work on Pan-Africanism has 
inspired numerous African thinkers and activists till now.  
 
However, the thesis focused on their role in depoliticizing economic issues and in generating 
an efficient bureaucracy from the aspect of a developmental state.  Through the case studies 
of Korea, under the leadership of Park Chung-hee and Ghana, under Kwame Nkrumah, the 
thesis revealed that a developmental leadership, which was committed to the economic 
development rather than political goals, effectively depoliticized economic issues and 
insulated a bureaucracy, and finally led to successful economic development. 
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